I develop an infinite-horizon model of a market in which new buyers and sellers arrive probabilistically. Upon arrival, each seller offers a single good for sale via an ascending auction. Buyers are endowed with private values and single-unit demand, and remain present on the market until they transact.
INTRODUCTION
Many internet markets, most notably eBay, sell multiple objects via sequential auctions in which a single object is sold at a time. In this paper, I examine a model of such markets in which new buyers and sellers arrive on the market at random times. Each bidder has an independently drawn private value for purchasing an object. In contrast to much of the sequential auction literature that makes use of sealedbid auctions, I focus on the ascending auction format.
This model serves as a useful abstraction of online auction sites, especially given the volume of trade occurring via * The complete version of this paper is available online at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1091350.
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single-unit auctions of homogenous goods. Typically, a variety of auctions for identical items are open simultaneously, but may be ordered by their closing time. Thus, abstracting away from intra-auction dynamics, a sequential auction model yields a good approximation. Moreover, as most online auctions bear a close resemblance to English auctions in regards to intra-auction dynamics as well as the visibility of submitted bids (both during and after an auction), it appears as though the ascending auction is better-suited than the sealed-bid second-price auction for modeling online auction markets.
RESULTS
I characterize an equilibrium for the game in which single units are sold sequentially via ascending auctions; this equilibrium is socially efficient, fully revealing, and periodic ex post incentive compatible. Moreover, strategies are memoryless-behavior in any given auction depends only upon the information revealed in the course of that auction, and not on any information revealed in earlier interactions.
I then demonstrate that the sequential ascending auction serves as an indirect mechanism that is equivalent-in this setting with random arrivals-to the dynamic VickreyClarke-Groves mechanisms studied by [1, 2] . In particular, I show that the equilibrium described above yields the same allocations and transfers as the dynamic VCG mechanism. Thus, the sequential ascending auction serves as an incentive compatible indirect mechanism for inducing socially efficient choices in dynamic environments.
